A practical mandatory access control model for XML databases by Zhu, H et al.
 A Practical Mandatory Access Control Model for XML Databases 
 
Hong  Zhu1, Kevin Lü2, Renchao  Jin1 
1Huazhong University of Science and Technology, Wuhan, Hubei, 430074, P.R. China 
2Brunel University, Uxbridge, UB8 3PH, UK 
 
Abstract. A practical mandatory access control (MAC) model for XML databases is presented in this paper. The 
label type and label access policy can be defined according to the requirements of different applications. In order to 
preserve the integrity of data in XML databases, a constraint between a read-access rule and a write-access rule in 
label access policy is introduced. Rules for label assignment and propagation are presented to alleviate the workload 
of label assignments. Furthermore, a solution for resolving conflicts in label assignments is proposed. Rules for 
update-related operations, rules for exceptional privileges of ordinary users and the administrator are also proposed 
to preserve the security of operations in XML databases. The MAC model, we proposed in this study, has been 
implemented in an XML database. Test results demonstrated that our approach provides rational and scalable 
performance.  
Keyword:  mandatory access control, XML databases, access control model, security. 
A Practical Mandatory Access Control Model for XML Databases 
 
Abstract. A practical mandatory access control (MAC) model for XML databases is presented in this paper. The label type and 
label access policy can be defined according to the requirements of different applications. In order to preserve the integrity of data 
in XML databases, a constraint between a read-access rule and a write-access rule in label access policy is introduced. Rules for 
label assignment and propagation are presented to alleviate the workload of label assignments. Furthermore, a solution for 
resolving conflicts in label assignments is proposed. Rules for update-related operations, rules for exceptional privileges of 
ordinary users and the administrator are also proposed to preserve the security of operations in XML databases. The MAC model, 
we proposed in this study, has been implemented in an XML database. Test results demonstrated that our approach provides 
rational and scalable performance.  
 
1 Introduction 
XML has been increasingly used in a variety of applications, and has become the standard for describing and 
exchanging data over the Internet. As more and more XML documents are stored in XML databases, the security of 
XML databases has become an important issue. Access control is one of the most important measures in 
guaranteeing the security of XML databases. The existing access control models for XML databases can be generally 
catalogued into two types: the discretionary access control model (DAC) and the mandatory access control model 
(MAC). In the DAC models, a subject who is a creator of an object can discretionally control privileges of other 
subjects accessing the object in XML databases but cannot resist attacks like Trojan horse because of inherent flaws.   
In a MAC model based on BLP model [2], every object is assigned a label which specifies the security privilege 
of the object, and every user is assigned a label which specifies what objects he/she can access. The label in [2] is a 
binary-tuple L=<l, c> consisting of a classification l, which belongs to an ordered sequence (e.g. unclassified ≤ 
confidential ≤ secret ≤ top-secret); and a category c, which is a subset of a set consisting of non-hierarchical and 
unordered elements (e.g.{HumanResource, Financial, Technical}). In the following discussion, we assume that L(s) 
and L(o) denote the labels for a subject and an object respectively. L(s).l is the classification of the label L(s) and 
L(s).c represents the category for the subject s. When an object is accessed by a subject, the label of the subject is 
compared with the label of the object using the following two rules:   
(1) simple security property: A subject s can read an object o only if L(o) ≤ L(s). 
      (2) *-property: A subject s can write an object o only if L(s) ≤ L(o). 
In the simple security property, label L(o) ≤ L(s) if and only if L(o).l ≤ L(s).l and L(o).c ⊆ L(s).c. We call L(o)≤ 
L(s) as L(s) dominates L(o). However, when applying the BLP model to databases, the *-property has to be modified 
to maintain the integrity of the data. Writing objects is allowed only when the subjects and objects have the same 
label. Therefore, the simple security property and the strict *- property need to be enforced [1, 15].  The strict *-
property is described as follows: 
strict *- property: A subject s can write an object o only if L(o)=L(s). 
The MAC security of a system based on the BLP model is sufficient in many cases, and it has been widely 
applied in military and government information systems [2]. However, the rules for label comparison in these 
systems are too rigorous in some cases. It indicates that the larger the category for an object is, the fewer the users 
that can access it. In some applications [18, 21], the rule for label comparison is not as rigorous as this. On the 
contrary, the requirement is: the larger the category for an object is, the more the users that can access it. Moreover, 
in these applications the structure of the label may be different from the structure of the label in the BLP model. In 
order to meet the needs of these applications, [14, 18, 21] have enhanced the flexibility of the MAC mechanism in 
relational databases. However, the existing MAC models [4, 15, 23] for XML databases are all based on the BLP 
model. The issue of how to make a flexible and practical MAC model for XML databases has not been addressed in 
the literatures. In order to overcome the limitations of previous MAC models for XML databases, new rules have to 
be introduced to make a MAC model be more flexible and can be applied for multi-purposes, meanwhile the security 
properties of the MAC model are maintained. That is the focus of this study.  
We propose a mandatory access control (MAC) model that consists of 12 rules specifying the constraints 
between a read-access rule and a write-access rule in label access policy, label assignment and propagation, a 
solution for resolving label assignment conflicts, and updating-related operations (including INSERT, UPDATE and 
DELETE) for XML databases. Fig. 1 illustrates the relationships amongst these 12 rules in our MAC model. Every 
node denotes a rule and the edge between two nodes denotes the relationship between the two rules. If there is an 
edge from rule A to rule B, rule A must take effect prior to rule B. After the structure of the labels and the label 
access policy are defined in the MAC, Rule 1 specifies the constraint between the read-access rule and the write-
access rule in label access policy to preserve the integrity of data in XML databases. Moreover, several label access 
policies can be defined in an XML database. Different label access policies can be assigned to different XML 
schemas and XML documents, but one document can only be assigned with one policy. Rule 2 specifies that a XML 
schema and its documents must be assigned with the same label access policy, and then a subject and an object can 
be assigned a label respectively. Rule 3 specifies that the label of the root of a schema is the label of its creator. Only 
after the XML schema is loaded into an XML database, XML documents can then be loaded. Rule 7 indicates that 
how to specify the label of the root of a XML document that has been loaded. There are three methods of assigning 
labels to objects in an XML document: assign labels to objects arbitrarily; propagate labels from the ancestors of the 
objects; and propagate labels from the nodes in a schema associated with the objects. Rule 4 and Rule 5 are related to 
label propagation. Rule 6 is for deciding the unique label for every object in an XML document. After every element 
or attribute in an XML document is assigned a label, the update-related operations for the document can be applied, 
which are specified in Rule 8, Rule 9 and Rule 10. Moreover, the exceptional privileges for ordinary users who create 
the XML documents and the exceptional privileges for administrator are specified in Rule 11 and Rule 12. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig.1. The relationships of rules in our model        Fig. 2.  An example for the label type 
The main contributions of this paper are:  
Rule1 Rule2 
Rule3 
Rule4 Rule7 
Rule5 
Rule6 
Rule8 Rule9 Rule10 
Rule11 Rule12 
<LabelType name = "COMDEPT"> 
<LabelComponents> 
<LabelComponent name = "Secret" type = "order"> 
<value>unclassified </value> 
<value>secret</value> 
<value>top-secret</value> 
</LabelComponent> 
<LabelComponent name = "Dept" type = "unorder"> 
<value>Technique</value> 
<value>HumanResource </value> 
<value>Financial</value> 
</LabelComponent> 
</LabelComponents> 
</LabelType> 
(1) A practical MAC model for XML databases is proposed. The label structure and label access policy can be 
defined according to the application requirements. We not only can define label access policies which are similar to 
label access policies in the BLP model for applications with high security, but also can define label access policies 
according to the application requirements in the way which is different from the BLP model. Therefore, our practical 
MAC model for XML databases can be used for more different applications. 
(2) In order to preserve the integrity of data in XML databases, a constraint between the read-access rule and 
write-access rule in label access policy has been introduced.  
(3) The rules for label assignment and label propagation are addressed to alleviate the workload of label 
assignments. A solution for the problem of conflicts in label assignments has been proposed. 
(4) The rules for update-related operations and the rules for exceptional privileges of both ordinary users and the 
administrators are developed to preserve the security of operations involving SELECT, UPDATE, and DELETE in 
XML databases. 
(5) We implemented our newly proposed practical MAC model in an XML database. All newly proposed rules 
and functions have been implemented. This enables us to verify the feasibility, effectiveness and flexibility of our 
approach. Our approach has been validated against the XMARK benchmark and the test results shown that the 
performance is rational and scalable.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 illustrates the preliminary concepts of our model. Section 
3 describes the practical MAC model for XML databases in detail. Section 4 discusses the implementation 
considerations of the system. Section 5 illustrates the experimental results. Section 6 describes the related work. 
Finally, Section 7 presents the conclusions and suggestions for future work.  
2 Preliminary Concepts 
The structure of the label in our MAC model is as follows: each label is specified by a label type, and the label 
type specifies what components the label type consists of, i.e. every component in a label is specified by a label 
component type. Normally, the structure of a label is specified by the administrator, which may or may not be the 
same as the structure of the label in the BLP model. 
Definition 1. Label component type. The label component type LC is a set of elements
1 2{ , , , }mLC c c c= … , 1m ≥  
and it also specifies whether the set is ordered or unordered. If LC is an ordered set, then c1 ≤ c2 ≤…≤ cm and we call 
it an ordered label component type. Otherwise, we call it an unordered label component type. 
Definition 2. Label component. The label component lc is an instance of a label component type. If LC is an 
ordered label component type then lc∈LC, otherwise lc ⊆ LC. 
Example 1. As shown in Fig.2, two label component types Secret and Dept are defined, where 
Secret=LC1={unclassified, secret, top-secret} is an ordered label component type with unclassified ≤ secret ≤ top-
secret. Any element in LC1 is a label component similar to the classification of the label in the BLP model; 
Dept=LC2={Technique, HumanResource, Financial} is an unordered label component type, Dept is a set of the 
department names of a company. Any subset of LC2 is a label component similar to the category of the label in the 
BLP model. 
Definition 3. Label type.  A label type is an n-tuple LT=<LC1 , … , LCn>, which is composed of n label 
component types. Here n≥1, LCi is a defined label component type. In order to prevent semantic confusion amongst 
labels, we specify that there is at most one ordered label component type in a label type. If a label type has an 
ordered label component type, then we specify that LC1 must be an ordered label component type.  
Example 2. Using a label type specifies the structure of the label. In Fig.2, a label type COMDEPT=<Secret, 
Dept> is defined.  
Definition 4. Label. A label L = <lc1 ,…, lcn> is an instance of a label type 1 2, , ..., nLT LC LC LC=< > . 
Where iLC (1 i n≤ ≤ ) is a defined label component type, and lci is a label component of iLC . 
Unlike the label in the BLP model, more than one unordered component type in a label type can be defined in our 
MAC model according to the various application requirements. 
Definition 5. Label access rule.  The label access rule is a four-tuple LAS=(L, T, OP, type), where L is a set of 
labels and T is the label type of L, type∈{r, w} indicates the rule is a read-access rule (type=r) or a write-access rule 
(type=w), and OP is a n-tuple OP=<op1, …, opn>. For any two labels l1, l2∈L, each opi indicates the operator 
between l1.ci and l2.ci (1≤ i ≤n). For an ordered label component type in T, the opi∈{EQ, LE, GE, GT, LT} denotes 
operators in {=, <=, >=, >, <,} respectively. For an unordered label component type in T, the opi ∈ {IN, 
INTERSECTION, CONTAIN, EQUAL}.  
Definition 6. Label access policy. The label access policy is a triple LP=(S, O, LASS), where S is a set of 
subjects, O is a set of objects, and LASS is a set of label access rules. The LASS consists of a read-access rule and a 
write-access rule. 
LP indicates that when a subject s∈S reads an object o∈O, the labels for the subject and the object must 
conform to the read-access rule. The labels for the subject and the object are compared according to the operations 
specified in LP.LASS.OP to determine whether the subject can read the object or not. In the following discussion, if a 
label L(s) and a label L(o) conform to a read-access rule in LP.LASS, it is denoted as L(s)ωr in LP.LASS L(o), if a label 
L(s) and a label L(o) conform to a write-access rule in LP.LASS, it is denoted as L(s)ωw in LP.LASS L(o). 
For a label access policy, we can define label access rules in an XML format file. The format of a rule for 
specifying an operator between two components in the labels of a subject and an object is: 
Subject.component-name <operator> Object.component-name 
Example 3.  Defining a label access policy. In Fig.3, a label access policy for the label type COMDEPT (in Fig.2) 
is defined. It consists of a read-access rule and a write-access rule. 
Fig. 3.    A label access policy 
In XML databases with our mandatory access control, the labels of a subject and an object are compared 
according to the label access rules. Our model supports the INTERSECTION operator when we compare two labels; 
this is different from the other MAC models [4, 15, 23] for XML databases. However, when the operation 
< Policy labeltype = " COMDEPT "> 
<!-- A subject is allowed to read an object, iff Secret component of the subject is higher than or equal to --!> 
<!--Secret component of the object and the intersection of Dept of the subject and Dept of the object are not empty --!> 
<!-- A subject is allowed to write an object, iff Secret component of the subject is less than or equal to --!> 
<!--Secret component of the object and Dept component of the subject is in Dept component of the object --> 
<Rules action = "read" > 
        <Rule> subject.Secret GE object.Secret </Rule> 
        <Rule> subject.dept  INTERSECTION  object.dept </Rule> 
</Rules> 
<Rules action = "write" > 
        <Rule>subject.Secret LE object.Secret</Rule> 
        <Rule>subject.dept  IN  object.dept</Rule> 
</Rules> 
</Policy> 
INTERSECTION appears in the read-access rule, the domination relationship between two labels has not been 
defined in our MAC model; therefore, less restriction has been imposed to make it more flexible. This can be 
demonstrated in the following example.  
Example 4. Assume L1=<secret, {Technique, Financial}> and L2=<secret, {HumanResource, Financial}> are 
two labels, L1 is assigned to a user and L2 is assigned to an object. Clearly, the user could read the object under the 
label access policy shown in Fig.3 because L1.secret≥L2.secret and L1.{Technique, Financial} INTERSECTION 
L2.{HumanResource, Financial} is not empty (L1 and L2 matched the read-access rule), meanwhile 
L2.secret≥L1.secret and L2.{Technique, Financial} INTERSECTION L1.{HumanResource, Financial} is neither not 
empty (L2 and L1 also  matched the read-access rule).  However, in the BLP model, if L1 and L2 as well as L2 and L1 
matched the simple security property, then L1=L2. Therefore, under the label access policy in Fig.3, for such a case, 
whether L1 dominates L2 or L2 dominates L1 can not be decided. But in our model, the relationship between L1 and L2 
can still exist. 
3 The Mandatory Access Control Model 
3.1 The rule for label access policy 
When a subject attempts to access an object, the read-access rule is applied to decide whether the user can read 
the object. When a subject attempts to insert an object into an XML document, or attempts to update or delete an 
object from an XML document, the read-access rule must be evaluated to locate the object to be inserted, updated or 
deleted. Therefore, in our MAC model any user can read what he/she wrote before. Otherwise, the integrity of data 
would not be maintained. Therefore, we introduce the following constraint:  
Rule 1. The constraint of label access policy. For a label access policy LP=(S, O, LASS), the write-access rule 
contains the read-access rule. Namely, for any subject s∈S, and any object o∈O, the privilege of L(s) ωw in LP.LASS 
L(o) is higher than L(s) ωr in LP.LASS L(o). 
3.2  Labelled subjects and XML documents 
The subjects of our MAC model are the users who access the XML databases, or application programs, or agents 
on behalf of users. After the label type is created, the administrator assigns labels to users, elements or attributes in 
XML documents or schemas. Every user except the administrator has a unique label, and so does as every object in 
XML documents.  
The objects are elements/attributes in XML documents and schemas. We denote the objects in XML documents 
using XPath [19]. As the XML document and schema conform to the same XML grammar, the labelled schema and 
its XML documents have the same notations. We only formally describe the labelled XML document below. The 
same principle can be applied for formally defining XML schema. 
Definition 7. Labelled XML document. The XML document XDoc with labels is an eleven-tuple XDoc=(Ve, 
vr, Va, Ns, Ls, T, LP, elemR, attrR, nameR, labelR). We have:  
(1) Ve is the set of all elements in the document; 
(2) vr is the root of the document, vr is also an element of the document, vr∈Ve; 
(3) Va is the set of all attributes in the document; 
(4) Ns is the set of names, including the names of elements and attributes; 
(5) Ls is the set of all labels with a label type T; 
(6) T is the label type which specifies the structure of the labels in the document; 
(7) LP is the label access policy, and LP determines the set of label access rules including a read-access rule and a 
write-access rule; 
(8) elemR is a binary-tuple, elemR ⊆ Ve× Ve. If e1∈Ve, e2∈Ve, then (e1,e2)∈ elemR denotes e2 is a sub-
element of e1 or there exists a link between e1 and e2; 
(9) attrR is a binary-tuple, attrR ⊆ Ve× Va. If e∈Ve, a∈Va then (e, a)∈attrR denotes a is an attribute of e; 
(10) nameR is a binary-tuple, nameR ⊆ Ns× (VaU Ve). If n∈Ns, v∈VaU Ve, then (n, v)∈nameR denotes that 
n is the name of v. As different elements or attributes in the same document may have the same names, one member 
of Ns may be mapped into different members of VaU Ve; 
(11) labelR is a binary-tuple, labelR ⊆ (VaU Ve)× Ls. If L∈Ls, v∈VaU Ve, then (v, L)∈ labelR denotes L is 
the label of v, or L=L(v). Different elements or attributes may have the same label, and every element or attribute has 
only one label.  
For a document not being labelled, it is a seven-tuple Doc=(Ve, vr, Va, Ns, elemR, attrR, nameR). The meanings 
of these symbols are the same as those in the XDoc. 
In the following discussion, we use XDoc and XSch to denote a labelled XML document and schema, 
respectively. For example, we also denote XDoc.T and XDoc.LP as a label type and a label access policy for the 
XML document. From the definition of XDoc, we have: for any label access rule las∈XDoc.LP.LASS, XDoc.T=las.T. 
3.3 The label assignment rules for XML objects 
Multiple label access policies can be defined for different security requirements but every document can be 
assigned only one label access policy. After an XML document or schema is loaded, a label access policy is first 
assigned for them. Then, the labels for elements or attributes in the XML document and schema are assigned. 
3.3.1 The constraint of a label access policy between an XML schema and its documents 
An XML schema defines a set of XML documents with the same structures and similar contents. The label access 
policy should be the same for the schema and its documents. 
Rule 2. The constraint of label access policy between an XML schema and its documents. If the labelled XML 
schema is XSch and one of its documents is XDoc, then XSch.LP=XDoc.LP. 
3.3.2 The rules for label assignment and propagation 
When an XML schema is created, the label for the root of the schema should be assigned. For an ordinary user, 
when he/she creates an XML schema, the label for the root of the schema is equal to the label of the user. So we have 
the following Rule 3:  
Rule 3. The label for the root of an XML schema. For an ordinary subject s, if s creates an XML schema sch, 
then L(sch.vr)=L(s).  
If the schema is created by the administrator, the label for the root of the schema must be assigned explicitly. 
Rule 12 (in section 3.3.5) is about the exceptional privilege for the administrator. 
There are a large number of elements and attributes in an XML document. If each element or attribute is assigned 
a label, the workload for management of these labels would be enormous. One solution to his is that we may make 
use of the following features of XML to alleviate the administrator’s workload:  
(1) An XML schema defines a set of XML documents with the same structure and similar contents. Usually, 
these XML documents have the same security attributes;  
(2) XML documents are hierarchical and every element has its sub-elements or attributes except for the leaves. 
The administrator needs to only assign labels to XML schemas and some elements in XML documents, then the 
labels are propagated to instance elements or attributes in the XML documents of the schema, or the labels are 
propagated to descendent elements and attributes of the labelled elements downward from the root to leaves.   
Rule 4. Label propagation from an XML schema to XML documents. For a labelled XML document XDoc and 
its schema XSch, an instance object io∈XDoc.VaU XDoc.Ve, and a schema object so∈XSch.VaU XSch.Ve, assume 
io is one of the instances of the schema object so, then L(io)=L(so).  
Rule 5. Label propagation from an element to its sub-elements and attributes. Assume XDoc is a labelled XML 
document, for any element e1, e2∈ Ve (or attribute a1∈ Va), if (e1, e2)∈ elemR (or (e1, a1)∈  attrR), then 
L(e2)=L(e1)(or L(a1)=L(e1)). 
3.3.3 A solution for conflicts of label assignments 
Rule 3, Rule 4 and Rule 5 are designed to enhance the flexibility of label assignment and alleviate the workload 
of the administrator, but may result in the assignments of several different labels to one object. For example, an 
element in an XML document may have three labels. The first one is propagated from its ancestor, the second one is 
propagated from the schema, and the third one is assigned directly by the administrator. In order to guarantee that 
every object in an XML document has only one label, we introduce a rule for deciding labels under a specific label 
access policy to solve label assignments conflicts. 
Rule 6. The label deciding rule. Assume a read access rule lasr=(L, T, OP, r), L1 =<a1, a2, …, an>∈L and L2 
=< b1, b2, …, bn >∈L are two labels of label type T, if L1 and L2 are two labels assigned to the same object by direct 
assignment or by propagation, respectively, we can decide and assign a new label L3=<c1, c2, …, cn> for the object, 
where each component of L3 is decided as follows: 
(1) For the ordered label component type in the T, if the operator in the lasr.OP.op1 is: 
(i) GE or GT, then L3.c1=max(L1.a1, L2.b1); 
(ii) LE or LT, then L3.c1=min(L1.a1, L2.b1); 
(iii)EQ, then L3.c1=max(L1.a1, L2.b1); 
Here the max(l1, l2) is a function to decide the maximum of l1 and l2, min(l1, l2) is a function to decide the 
minimum of l1 and l2. 
(2)In the following formulas, if there is an ordered label component type in the label type then i≥2, otherwise i≥1. 
For an unordered label component type in T, if the operator lasr.OP.opi is: 
(i) IN, then L3.ci = L1.ciI L2.ci; 
(ii) CONTAIN, then L3.ci = L1.ciU L2.ci; 
(iii) INTERSECTION, then L3.ci = L1.ciI L2.ci; 
(iv) EQUAL, then L3.ci = L1.ci. 
Rule 6 can be extended to decide and assign a unique label for an object when the object may be assigned up to 
three labels due to direct assignment or propagation. Because the least upper bound does not exist for the 
INTERSECTION operator in the sense of the least upper bound defined for the CONTAIN operator in [15], a simple 
deciding rule for an INTERSECTION operator is used in Rule 6. When an INTERSECTION operator is specified for a 
component in a label access policy, we specify that the component of the resulting label is at the intersection of the 
corresponding components of two labels. Such a case may occur when some object cannot be accessed by any users 
except the administrator or the creator of the XML document which the object belongs to. The example below 
illustrates this problem. 
Example 5. If the labels <secret, {Technique, Financial}> and <secret, {HumanResource}> are assigned to an 
object by propagation rules and direct assignment, and the intersection of {Technique, Financial} and 
{HumanResource} is empty, then the object cannot be accessed by any user except the administrator and the creator 
of the XML document which the object belongs to.   
Consequently, Rule 6 guarantees that the security of a sub-node is higher than the security of its parent in an 
XML document. In the following discussion, we use function label_comput(L1, L2) to denote the result from Rule 6 
where L1, L2 are two labels. Based on Rule 1 to Rule 6, we have the following property: 
Property:  For a labelled XML document XDoc and its label access policy XDoc.LP, for elements e1, e2∈Ve (or 
attribute a2∈Va), and an ordinary user s, if (e1, e2)∈elemR (or (e1, a1)∈attrR), from Rule1 ~ Rule 6, we have:  
(1) if L(s) ωr in XDoc.LP.LASS L(e2) (or L(s) ωr in XDoc.LP.LASS L(a1)) then L(s)ωr in XDoc.LP.LASS L(e1). 
    (2) if L(s) ωw in XDoc.LP.LASS L(e2) (or L(s )ωw in XDoc.LP.LASS L(a1)) then L(s) ωw in XDoc.LP.LASS L(e1). 
3.3.4 The rules for modification-related operations 
As the label access policy for an XML database is defined according to the security requirements of the 
applications, modification-related operations may have an impact on the labels or the structure of XML documents. 
When a subject loads an XML document, the label of the subject is compared with the label of the root of the 
schema. If they conform to the write-access rule in the label access policy, the label of the root would be decided 
from the label of the subject and the label of the root of the schema of the loaded XML documents by Rule 6. We 
have the following Rule 7 for loading an XML document: 
Rule 7. Loading XML documents. Assume XSch is a labelled XML schema, s is a subject, if L(s)ωw in XDoc.LP.LASS 
L(XSch.vr) and s loads an XML document Doc conforming to XSch, then the loading would be successful and 
L(Doc.vr)= label_comput(L(s), L(XSch.vr)).  
 Rule 6 and Rule 7 indicate that the MAC can resolve the security problems in the DAC models. We give the 
following example. 
Example 6. Assume that we have only enforced the DAC in an XML database. A user s1 could access several 
objects (not all objects) in an XML document Doc1, but user s2 could not access any objects in Doc1. User s1 could 
leak information in Doc1 by creating a new document Doc2 which consists of the objects user s1 could access, and 
then user s1 authorizes all the access privileges of all objects in Doc2 to s2. Therefore, s2 would indirectly be able to 
obtain the information in Doc1. If the MAC is enforced by the label access policy in Fig.3 in the XML database, s1 
and s2 are assigned labels L(s1) and L(s2) respectively (L(s1)≠L(s2)), so that L(s1) ωr in XDoc.LP.LASS L(s2) is true and 
L(s2) ωr in XDoc.LP.LASS L(s1) is not true. According to Rule 7, the label of the root in Doc2 would be L(s1) (assume that 
there is no schema for Doc2). Although s1 could authorize all the access privileges for objects in Doc2 to s2, 
according to Rule 6 and Rule 7, all of the labels for objects in Doc2 are equal to L(s1). So s2 could not access Doc2 
because L(s2) ωr in XDoc.LP.LASS L(s1) would not be true.  
If a subject modifies the labels of some objects in an XML document in the update operations, some other users’ 
access privileges may be changed unintentionally. That may cause illegal information transmission (information 
leaking). So we have the following Rule 8. 
Rule 8. Label of the object for update operations. Assume a subject s updates an object o∈VeU Va in a 
labelled XDoc, then L(o) is not changed. 
For insertion operations, we should first locate the object o1 which is the parent of the object o2 to be inserted. 
From the Property, we can also gain access to the parent of o2. According to Rule 4 and Rule 5, the inserted object o2 
may have two labels propagated from its ancestor and schema, respectively. We shall decide L(o2) and then compare 
the label of the user with L(o2). If the label of the user and L(o2) satisfy the write-access rule in the label access 
policy, the insertion operation is permitted.  
Rule 9. Label of the object for insertion operations. Assume user s is going to insert an object o2 as a sub-node 
of an object o1 in a labelled XDoc; o1∈XDoc.Ve and o2∈XDoc.VeU XDoc.Va. Assume L’(o2) is the label of o1 
propagated from the nodes in the schema of XDoc associated with o1, L(o2’)= label_comput(L(o1), L’(o2)). If L(s) ωw 
in XDoc.LP.LASS L(o2’), then an insertion operation is permitted, and the final label for o2: L(o2)=label_comput(L(s), 
L(o2’)). 
As the insertion and deletion operations may modify the structure of the XML documents, the structure of the 
updated documents must conform to the constraints of their schema. When an XML schema is defined, the 
maximum or minimum occurrences for the sub-elements of an element may be defined. So the operations should 
follow the constraints: the number of sub-elements must be no more than the maximum occurrences defined for the 
element after the sub-element is inserted into an element; the number of sub-elements left must be no less than the 
minimum occurrences defined for the element after a sub-element is deleted from the element.  
Rule 10. Constraints for insertion and deletion operations. XSch is an XML schema, XDoc is one of the 
documents of XSch, (e1, e2)∈XSch.elemR. Assume (ne, e2) ∈XDoc.nameR, and there exists the following constraints 
on e1: 
(1)The maximum occurrence of ne is max1; 
(2)The minimum occurrence of ne is min1; 
Then, after any insertion operation on e1, the occurrence of ne ≤ max1; after any deletion operation on e1, the 
occurrence of ne ≥ min1. 
3.3.5  Exceptional privileges 
Ordinary users can load XML documents and schemas. After an ordinary user has loaded an XML document or a 
schema and the administrator has assigned the labels, the ordinary user may not be able to query all the objects in the 
document or schema because of the label access policy. In order to prevent confusions for ordinary users “missing” 
objects he/she loaded earlier and to prevent transmission of information covertly, we intgioduce exceptional 
privileges to ordinary users who create XML documents or schemas.  
Rule 11. Exceptional privileges for creators of XML documents and schemas. If an ordinary user s loads an 
XML document or a schema, and the administrator assigns labels to the objects in the document or the schema, then 
for any object o∈VeU Va in XDoc, s can access o without complying with the label access policy. 
Although the administrator maintains labels in the system, the administrator does not have a label. How do we 
deal with the initial labels for the XML documents and schemas loaded by the administrator? To solve the problem, 
we give the following Rule 12. 
Rule 12. Exceptional privileges for the administrator. The administrator can load XML documents and schemas, 
and the administrator must also assign an initial label to the root of the loaded XML documents and schemas. 
4. Implementation Considerations 
4.1 The architecture of the MAC for XML databases 
We have implemented our MAC model in an XML database management system. We used Dom4J as our parser 
for the XML schemas and documents. The main tool for the program is JDK1.4+Eclipse3.0+Dom4J [6, 7]. The 
architecture of the XML database management system is shown in Fig.4. It consists of five main modules, which are 
all within the rectangle with dashed line: policy management module, schema and document loader module, policy 
service module, query module (process read-only operations) and modification module (process update-related 
operations).   
A tool was developed for managing label access policy at the client end. With this tool, the label type and label 
access policy can be defined and managed. After the policy management module accepts requests from this tool, it 
converts the label access policy and label type into an XML file and stores the XML file into the security repository. 
There are two types of XML files in the security repository: label access policy file and label assignment file for 
users. The security repository is invisible to ordinary users but is visible to the administrator.  
The administrator and ordinary users can load the schemas or XML documents by using the schema and document 
loader module. The initial labels for the schemas and documents are assigned by the policy service module. The 
labelled XML schemas and documents are stored into the labelled XML documents and schemas repository. 
Moreover, by using this tool labels are assigned to users and objects in XML documents and schemas. For objects in 
an XML document, the unique labels are computed and the labelled XML documents and schemas are stored.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4.  Architecture of the MAC in XML database 
The query module has two sub-modules: query rewriting and executor. When a user submits a query, in the query 
module the original query is first rewritten according to the label of the user, then the rewritten query is executed, and 
the final results are returned to the user. The objects in XML documents are updated by the modification module. 
When a user submits a modification request, the query module is executed first to find or locate the objects to be 
updated, deleted or inserted, and then updated documents are stored in the XML database.  
4.2 Key techniques for implementation  
4.2.1 The assignment of labels for users and objects in XML documents 
When a label type is defined, it is converted into an inner denotation in the system. For example, an element in the 
order label components is denoted as a number, and a set of the unordered label components is represented as a string 
of ‘1’ or ‘0’ that denotes whether an element occurs or not. Therefore, if an operator for an unordered label 
component includes CONTAIN, and when the unordered label component for a user contains the unordered label 
component for an object, each ‘0’ in the string for the unordered label component of the object indicates that the 
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character in the corresponding position of the string for the unordered label component of the user should also be ‘0’. 
Similar processes are also developed for IN and INTERSECTION operators. By this way, labels for the users and 
objects are compared.  
In order to assign labels to documents in an XML database, the structure of XML documents is modified. A label 
is attached as an attribute for each object in the documents. However, the schema of the XML documents should not 
be changed because the XML schema defines the structure of many XML documents. So when an XML schema is 
loaded, a schema map document is created for the schema. Initially, the schema map document is the XML schema, 
then the mapping relationships between the objects in the schema and objects in the XML documents are added, and 
the labels for the schema are also stored as attributes of the objects in the schema map document. The schema map 
document is also stored in the labelled XML documents and schemas repository. When the administrator assigns a 
label to the objects in XML documents or the schemas, Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2 (shown in Fig.5) are executed to 
compute the labels for objects in XML documents. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
When all the objects in an XML document are assigned a label, the XML document is stored to the labelled XML 
documents and schemas repository. Clearly, the size of an XML document would be increased and that would affect 
the performance of the system because of the extra I/O and other operations costs. 
4.2.2 Query rewriting 
After the users and XML documents are labelled, the system could accept the Query operation (deals with read-
only operations - SELECT operations) and update-involved operations in the XML database. Because the Query 
Algorithm 1: Assigning a label to an object in an XML schema 
Input: a parsed schema map document tree for the schema, assume Rs is the root; 
the path expression for the schema path and  
the label label1 
Output: the newly labelled XML schema map document 
Step1: find the object so in the schema map document tree for the path 
Step2: if  (the parent of so exists)  then 
                find the parent pa of so; 
                if  (the label of pa exists)  then 
                    obtain the label paLabel of pa; 
                    label1 = label_comput(label1, paLabel);  
                end 
           end 
step 3: if (so has a label) then 
                    obtain the label label_old of so; 
                    label1 = label_comput(label1, label_old); 
           end 
assign label1 to so  
obtain the set of subnodes of so Set_So; 
if (the Set_So is empty) then return; 
for each c in Set_So call algorithm 1 recursively with the parameters: Rs, c, label1 
end Algorithm1 
 
Algorithm 2: Assigning a label to an object in an XML document 
Input:  a parsed XML document doc1, assume Rt is the root; 
the path expression path for an object in the XML document doc1; 
the label label1 
Output: the newly labelled XML document tree 
Step1:  according to the path, find the objects to a set path_Set from the document tree doc1 
            for each element io in path_Set do 
Step2:      if  (io has a corresponding schema object)  then 
                      obtain the label schemaLabel for the corresponding schema object of io; 
    label1 = label_comput(label1, schemaLabel); 
               end 
Step3:     if  (the parent of io exists)  then 
                    obtain the label parentLabel of the parent of io; 
                    label1 = label_comput(label1, paLabel); 
           end 
Step4:     if (io has a label label_old) then 
                        label1 = label_comput(label1, label_old); 
               end 
assign label1 to io  
obtain the set of subnodes Set_So of io. 
if (the Set_So is empty) then return; 
for each c in Set_So call algorithm 2 recursively with the parameters: Rt, c, label1. 
     endfor 
end Algorithm2 
Fig 5.  Algorithms for label assignment 
operation is an important operation in the system and is the basis of other operations, we describe the process of 
Query operation in the system in detail. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CreatePredicate: generate security predicate according to the label of the user and the read-access control rule 
input:     label of user userLabel 
               the read-access control rule AccessRule 
output:   the security predicate for the query: predicate 
 predicate = "";   LABEL = "@label"; 
obtain the number of components m from AccessRule 
              for i  = 1 to m do 
                     begin 
                           obtain the ith operation pi in AccessRule.OP.pi; 
                           sub_predicate = ""; 
                           obtain the ith component coml of userLabel; 
                           switch (pi) 
                                 case CONTAIN:  for each character chj in coml do       
                                                              if (chj= = '0') then  
if (sub_predicate = ="") then sub_predicate = "substring(" + LABEL + i+ "," + j + "," +'0'); 
else sub_predicate += " AND substring(" + LABEL + i+ " , " + j + ", " +'0'); 
                                                        endif 
break; 
                                 case INTERSECTION:   
                                                              for each character chj in coml do 
                                                              if (chj = = '1') then  
if (sub_predicate = ="") then sub_predicate = " substring(" + LABEL + i +"," + j + "," +'1'); 
else sub_predicate += " OR substring(" + LABEL + i +"," + j + "," +'1'); 
                                                        endif 
break 
                                 case  IN:          for each character chj in coml do 
                                                              if (chj = = '1') then  
if (sub_predicate = ="") then sub_predicate = " substring(" + LABEL + i +", " + j + "," +'1'); 
sub_predicate += " AND substring(" + LABEL + i+"," + j + "," +'1'); 
           endif 
break; 
case EQUAL:  sub_predicate = LABEL + i + "=" + coml;   break; 
                                 case >=: sub_predicate = LABEL + i + "<=" + coml;    break; 
                                 case >:   sub_predicate = LABEL + i + "<" + coml;      break; 
                                 case <=: sub_predicate = LABEL + i + ">=" + coml;   break; 
                                 case <:   sub_predicate = LABEL + i + ">" + coml;     break; 
                           endswitch 
                          if (predicate=="") then predicate = sub_predicate else  predicate += " AND (" + sub_predicate + ")"; 
                    enddo 
               return   predicate; 
endCreatePredicate 
 
Query_rewritten: rewrite the query Q according to the label of the user userLabel 
Input:    the query Q expressed by Xpath; 
             the label of the user userLabel 
Output: the rewritten query Qd 
              obtain the labelled schema sch for query Q; 
obtain the read-access control rules AccessRule according to sch; 
predicate = CreatePredicate(userLabel, AccessRule,); 
              decompose the query Q into a set of searching expressions CC according to the separator '/' or '//' or other separators; 
              /* if '/' or '//' is included in an expression, we did not divide the expression into two sub expressions*/ 
              Qd=""; Qd += the first separator 
             for each node c in CC do 
               begin 
                  divide c into a set of sub expressions EXP; 
                  for each con in EXP do 
                   c1='['; c2=']'; qc1=""; 
                   if con contains c1 then 
                     begin 
                        get the node node1 before c1; 
                        if (node1 != NULL) then Qd += node1 + '[' + predicate; endif 
  find another character c2 matched with c1 ; 
                        get string str1 between c1 and c2; 
                      qc1 = Query_rewritten(str1, userLabel) ; 
                    end  /* if con contain c1 */        
                  else begin 
            divide con into a set of searching conditions SC 
                             for each search condition qc in SC do  /*qc contained predication conjunction*/ 
                             if qc contain one of the operations <,<=, >, >=, = then 
                                 divide qc into q/*queried node*/, op/*operation*/), const/*constant*/, and conj/*conjuction, can be null*/; 
                                 qc1 += q + '[' + predicate + ']' + op + const + conj; 
                              else qc1 += q + '[' + predicate + ']'; 
                             endif 
                         end 
                 if (con contains c1 and node1 !=NULL and qc1 != "") then  Qd += ' and ' + qc1 + ']'; else Qd += qc1; endif 
                 Qd += conjunction predicate after con           
              end  /* for con*/ 
           Qd += separator '/' or '//' or other separators;  
          end  /* for node c*/ 
          return Qd; 
endQuery_rewritten 
Fig 6.  The pseudo code for the query rewritten 
When a user submits a query request, the system checks every XML document involved in the query whether the 
document was created by the user or not. If it was created by the user, Rule 11 is applied and the query results are 
returned without the MAC involvement. 
If the document was not created by the user, the query processing continues. The label access policy is searched 
from the security repository to obtain the label access rules. Then the query request is parsed and the query is first 
rewritten according to the label of the user and read-access rule by adding the label of the user as a searching 
condition in the query. The pseudo code for the query rewritten is shown in Fig.6. Next, the rewritten query is 
executed, and the intermediate objects which do not satisfy the read-access rule will be filtered. While a query is 
processed in this way, an inference attack can be prevented, as illustrated in the following example 7.  
Example 7. Assume that the label access rules, as shown in Fig.3, are applied. A user u with label <unclassified, 
{Technique}> in Technical Department submits a query: /companys/employee[salary =“6000”]/name, and the label 
of object (salary of Alice) is <secret, {Technique}>. If the salary of Alice was not filtered out from the results of the 
query, then a user u can infer that the salary of Alice is 6000. In order to prevent u from inferring unauthorized data 
by the query, the query above was rewritten by our system as: /companys[@label1<=1 and substring(@label2, 3, 
1)=’1’]/employee[@label1<=1 and substring(@label2, 3, 1) = ’1’ and salary[@label1<=1 and substring(@label2, 
3,1)=’1’] = ”6000” ] / name [@label1 <=1 and substring(@label2, 3, 1)=’1’] . When the rewritten query is 
executed, the object salary of Alice is filtered out and the results of the query do not contain salary of Alice.  
5. Experimental Results 
We tested our MAC model in an XML database system for a number of purposes: to demonstrate the validity of 
our MAC model; to process different types of queries; to evaluate the performance impact of adding our MAC into 
an XML database. The experimental results are presented in this section. The test environment was two desktop 
computers with 2.8GHZ CPU, 1G memory and Windows XP (SP2) operating system. The XMark benchmark dataset 
[26] was used in our experiments. We used the tools of XMark to generate XML documents of different sizes, 
assigned the labels to objects in XML schemas and documents, and measured the response time of different queries 
with and without the MAC be installed. 
5.1 The labels for subjects and objects  
We used two types of applications (App1 and App2) in our experiments. The main feature of App1 is that the 
larger the category for an object is, so a smaller number of users that can access it, and different from App1, the main 
feature of App2 is that the larger the set of category for an object is, so a larger number of users can access it. The 
label types shown in Table 1 are used in the two applications. Two label access policies AP1 and AP2 were defined 
in the Table 2. From the label access policies in Table 2, we can see that the application App1 is for a multilevel 
secure system and the application App2 is not. 
After the label types and label access policies were created, the administrator loaded the XML schemas and 
documents, and created four users Lisa, Tom, Alice and Mary for App1 and two users Mary, Tom for App2. The 
administrator then assigned the labels shown in Table 3 to those users in these two applications. Next, the 
administrator assigned labels to the XML schemas and documents. Tables 4 and 5 illustrate the labels assigned to 
XML schema and documents. 
 
 
 
Table 1.   The label types 
label component Label component type The set of elements 
Level Ordered component Common<Private<Secret <Top secret 
Category Unordered component Buyer, Seller, Maker 
Table 2.  The label access policies 
The groups of access 
policies 
Type of access Label access policy 
 
The first label access 
policy  AP1 for App1 
Read rule The level of the subject is larger than the level of the object, and the category of 
the subject contains the category of the object 
Write rule The level of the subject is equal to the level of the object, and the category of the 
subject is equal to the category of the object 
 
The second label 
access policy  AP2 for 
App2 
Read rule The level of the subject is larger than the level of the object, and the category of 
the subject is contained in the category of the object 
Write rule The level of the subject is equal to the level of the object, and the category of the 
subject is equal to the category of the object 
Table 3.  The users in App1 and App2 applications 
Name of users Label assigned to the user 
For App1 
 Lisa <Private, {Buyer, Seller}> 
 Tom <Secret, {Buyer, Seller, Maker }> 
 Alice <Common, {Buyer}> 
 Mary <Secret, {Buyer}> 
For App2 
 Tom <Secret, {Buyer, Seller, Maker }> 
 Mary <Secret, {Buyer}> 
 
Table 4.  Label assignments for XML schema                    Table 5.  Label assignments for XML documents 
For  App1  For  App1 
Objects  in  schema Label   Objects  in  document Label 
/site <Common, {Buyer}> //site <Common, {Buyer}> 
/site/people/person/profile <Private, {Buyer, Seller}> //site/regions/asia/item <Private, {Buyer, Seller}> 
                     For  App2 //site/people <Private, {Buyer, Seller}> 
//site/people/person/profile/age <Secret, {Buyer, Seller, Maker}> 
Objects  in  schema Label  For   App2 
/site <Common, {Buyer, Seller, Maker}>  //site/regions/asia/item <Private, {Buyer, Seller}> 
/site/people/person/profile <Private, {Buyer, Seller, Maker} 
5.2. The queries and analysis of their results 
The requests submitted by users in Table 3 are the following four queries: 
Q1: //site/regions 
Q2: //site/people/person/profile[/age= ‘33’] 
Q3: //site/regions/*/items/name 
Q4: //site/open_auctions/open_auction/initial 
Our tests for these queries over different sizes of documents are analogous, in the way that the main difference is 
that the numbers of nodes contained in the query results are increased when the sizes of the documents are increased. 
So instead of showing all the results we obtained - due space limit, we only show the results of Q2 for Tom in an 
XML document with a size of 10.5MB after the document is labelled, which can be found at Appendix 1. 
Furthermore, in Table 6 we list the numbers of nodes returned for different applications, users and queries over XML 
documents before and after being labelled by our MAC model.  
 
 
 
Table 6. Results of the queries in different applications 
Applications user Query Number of nodes returned with MAC Number of nodes returned without MAC 
 
 
 
 
 
App1 
Alice  
Q1 
31407 34650 
Lisa 34650 34650 
Tom 34650 34650 
Mary 31407 34650 
Alice  
Q2 
0 77 
Lisa 0 77 
Tom 77 77 
Mary 0 77 
Alice  
Q3 
1185 1305 
Lisa 1305 1305 
Tom 1305 1305 
Mary 1185 1305 
Alice  
Q4 
720 720 
Lisa 720 720 
Tom 720 720 
Mary 720 720 
App2 Mary Q2 77 77 
Tom 77 77 
For the application App1, based on Table 4, Table 5, Rule 4, Rule 5 and Rule 6, all the nodes and sub-nodes of the 
path: //site/regions are labelled with <Common, {Buyer}>, except nodes and sub-nodes of the path: 
//site/regions/asia/item. The nodes and sub-nodes of the path://site/regions/asia/item are labelled with <Common, 
{Buyer, Seller}>. According to the read-access rule of AP1, Alice could not access the nodes and sub-nodes of 
//site/regions/asia/item because her label is <Common, {Buyer}>. Therefore, the number of nodes for Alice returned 
from Q1 is about 10% less than that of Lisa and Tom, and the number of nodes for Alice returned from Q3 is also 
about 10% less than that of Lisa and Tom. Because the nodes and sub-nodes of the 
path://site/people/person/profile/age are labelled with <Secret, {Buyer, Seller, Maker}>, these nodes are only 
obtained for the query requested by user Tom with the label <Secret, {Buyer, Seller, Maker}>. Since the label for 
Mary is <Secret, {Buyer}>, the label <Secret, {Buyer}> and <Common, {Buyer}> match the read-access rule in AP1. 
Therefore Mary can see all the nodes Alice can see. It is exactly what App1 is designed for, and our model can 
support it effectively.  
We can also use our system to support application App2. We only demonstrate the difference of the two 
applications for the query Q2 because the results for other queries are analogous. According to Rule 4, Rule 5 and 
Rule 6, the nodes of the path://site/people/person/profile/age are labelled with <Secret, {Buyer, Seller, Maker}>. In 
application App1, Mary could not access the nodes labelled with <Secret, {Buyer, Seller, Maker}>, but in 
Application App2, she could see those nodes. This reflected the purpose of App2. It verified the fact that our system 
can support such an application which requires that “the larger the category for an object is, so a larger number of 
users that can access it”. More other tests were conducted for various purposes (but due to space limitation, only 
these two cases are reported here). Based on our tests, we can summery that:   
(1) Our MAC model is capable of defining different label access policies according to different application 
requirements. Tests on two types (App1 and App2) of applications are reported in this paper. Our MAC model can 
support both of them. They demonstrate that our MAC model is effective and practical.  
(2) Our approach provides tools for creating different policies based on different application requirements and 
produces the results users expected; it can assign labels to XML schemas and documents as well as users for 
different types of applications. It shows that our approach is very flexible. 
5.3. The performance of the queries and analysis 
For any operation in XML databases, the introduction of our MAC model would need more time to execute the 
query request: analyze and rewrite the query, and filter the intermediate results. Nevertheless, the extra time needed 
for the MAC should not cause a significant decrease in performance. The tests reported in this section are aimed to 
compare the response time of the system with and without MAC. The SELECT operation is the basis for update-
involved operations. The cost difference between the read-only operation (SELECT) and update-involved operations 
can be calculated if the amount of data needed to be updated can be estimated. In most cases, such cost differences 
are far less than the costs of locating data (SELECT). For simplicity, we only tested SELECT operations in our 
experiments to measure the overhead of our MAC model. For queries Q1 ~ Q4, we only show the response time 
differences for processing queries Q1 over different sizes in our experiments, and because queries Q1 ~ Q4 are 
simple queries, the results are similar. In our experiments, the response time of the queries Q1 ~ Q4 are mainly 
determined by the sizes of the documents and are not much related to the user who submitted the query. Q5: 
//listitem//keyword, is a complex query which involves ancestor-descendant structural joins. Fig.7 and Fig.8 show the 
response time for processing queries Q1 and Q5 on documents of different sizes in the XML database with and 
without the MAC.  
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Fig.7  The executing time of Q1                                         Fig.8  The executing time of Q5 
Table 7  The sizes of the documents before and after the documents are labelled 
Size of documents before labelled 0.027MB 0.56MB 1.15MB 2.3MB 5.7MB 7MB 
Size of documents after labelled 0.041MB 0.8MB 1.7MB 3.4MB 8.6MB 10.5MB 
 
From the figures (Fig. 7 and Fig. 8) and table (Table 7) above, we may observe the following facts: 
(1) In our experiments, the sizes of XML documents before and after the documents were labelled are shown in 
Table 7. We can see that the size of documents increases by about 33% after the documents are labelled. The 
performance of the query process decreases due to the extra I/Os are required when the same queries are executed on 
the same documents after the documents are labelled (see Fig. 7 and Fig.8). When the sizes of documents are small, 
there is not much difference on response time for labelled and unlabelled documents, but when the size of documents 
increases the difference on response time can be clearly observed.   
 (2) When Q1 and Q5 are executed, one extra cost when MAC installed is filtering the intermediate results to 
obtain the final results (in addition to the cost of extra disk I/O access due to the documents being labelled and 
documents sizes have been increased). When the size of the documents is increased, the performance of the system 
decreases, but the processing time for the same query over the same document before and after the document being 
labelled does not increase significantly, no matter the queries are simple or complex. As a result, it can be seen that 
the overall MAC system performance is rational, scalable and acceptable. 
6 Related Work  
  A number of measures have been proposed for XML database security, including access control, encryption [9], 
secure XML information publishing [13], digital signatures and more, but it is generally agreed that access control is 
the most effective approach. There are usually three types of access control: mandatory access control (MAC), 
discretionary access control (DAC) and role-based access control (RBAC) [17, 25]. 
Based on the BLP model [2], SungRan Cho et al [4] proposed the first MAC model for XML documents. 
However, in the model [4] the structure of DTD needs to be modified, and the structure of XML documents also has 
to be changed. Dong-Zhan Zhang et al [23] presented an extended MAC model for XML. They used strategies 
analogous to E. Damiani’s model [5] for authorizing privileges and resolving label assignment conflicts but they 
defined their own label assignment and overriding rules. Lan Li et al [15] proposed a MAC model for XML 
documents, in which labels can be assigned to users and elements/attributes in XML documents. When a user wants 
to access an object in an XML document, the label of the user and the label of the element/attribute are compared 
according to the simple security property and the strict *-property in the BLP model. Since these three models are all 
based on the BLP model, they inherited its drawbacks - lack of sufficient flexible mechanisms to define different 
security policies for different applications. Different from those models, our MAC model can define the label 
structures and label access policies according to the security requirements of XML applications. Not only we can 
define label access policies for XML database systems in the similar ways that models [4, 15, 23] can, but our model 
also can work for multi-purpose applications. Meanwhile constraints between a read-access rule and a write-access 
rule are maintained so that the integrity of data is preserved. In addition, the rules for update-related operations, for 
exceptional privileges of both ordinary users and the administrators are proposed to maintain the security of the 
XML documents. 
For relational database systems, Walid Rjaibi [18] proposed a multi-purpose MAC policy to enhance the 
flexibility of the MAC model. The administrator can define label types, label access rules, and exceptional privileges. 
This policy is suitable for different requirements and applications in relational databases. In addition, Oracle 10g [14, 
21] provides a label security product to enhance the flexibility of MAC. The models for Oracle databases are only 
suitable for relational databases, and in the model [18], the domination relationship between two labels is not 
discussed in detail. Inspired by the MAC policy in [18], a MAC model for XML databases is proposed. Meanwhile, 
the domination relationship in our model is not determined for any two labels because of the need of processing the 
INTERSECTION operation for label comparison (the reason was explained in Example 4 in Section 2).  
Another type of XML access control is based on DAC [3, 5, 8, 11, 12, 16, 24]. However, these models cannot 
resist attacks like Trojan horse that may result in information leaks. The reason was explained in Example 6 (in 
Section 3).  
XACML [17] is a specification of OASIS to express and deploy an access control policy based on XML and it is 
combined with RBAC models for XML [8, 25]. Although RBAC models are used in many applications, they can 
simplify the management of privileges of different roles for users. However, the limitation of the RBAC for XML 
has analogous security problems in DAC models because the invisible and sensitive data for a user or a role could be 
leaked by users or roles through transferring their own privileges to the other users or the roles (see Example 6). In 
contrast, our model can prevent such security problems which exist in DAC and RBAC models. 
7. Conclusions  
Providing mandatory access control model for databases is important for many database applications. In this 
study, we have developed a practical MAC model for XML databases for different purposes, including multilevel 
secure XML database systems. In our MAC model, label access policies can be defined according to the 
requirements of various applications, which enhance the flexibility of MAC models in general. A constraint between 
a read-access rule and a write-access rule has been proposed to maintain the integrity of data. Rules for label 
assignment and propagation are presented to alleviate the workload of label assignments, and a rule for solving label 
assignment conflicts is also introduced. Moreover, rules for modification-related operations, and exceptional 
privilege rules for ordinary users and the administrators are introduced. Nevertheless, the proposed MAC policy can 
be flexibly used in XML databases; therefore, it can be regarded as a generalization of BLP model for XML. 
Our MAC model has been implemented in an XML database, and the experiments demonstrate the 
effectiveness of our approach; our approach can define different access policies, and is able to achieve and realize the 
design purposes of different access policies. A performance study on the overhead caused by introducing the MAC 
on an XML database was also carried out; the test results indicate that the performance is rational, scalable and 
acceptable overall.  
In the future, we plan to extend out model to resolve the polyinstantiation problem for modification operations. 
We are also studying the issues on optimizing system performance. 
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Appendix 1: The results of Q2 for Tom over an XML document of 10.5MB (after the document is labelled). There 
are 77 nodes in the results. 
<?xml version="1.0" key= "test6.xml"?> 
<profile income="53373.22"><interest category="category55" /> 
<education>Other</education> 
<gender>male</gender> 
<business>Yes</business> 
<age>33</age> 
</profile> 
 
<profile income="23873.60"><gender>female</gender> 
<business>Yes</business> 
<age>33</age> 
</profile> 
 
<profile income="47823.80"><interest category="category58" /> 
<interest category="category4" /> 
<interest category="category21" /> 
<education>Graduate School</education> 
<business>No</business> 
<age>33</age> 
</profile> 
 
<profile income="64448.45"><gender>female</gender> 
<business>Yes</business> 
<age>33</age> 
</profile> 
 
<profile income="23092.52"><interest category="category9" /> 
<interest category="category10" /> 
<interest category="category26" /> 
<interest category="category51" /> 
<education>Graduate School</education> 
<business>Yes</business> 
<age>33</age> 
</profile> 
 
<profile income="43900.78"><interest category="category56" /> 
<interest category="category57" /> 
<education>High School</education> 
<business>Yes</business> 
<age>33</age> 
</profile> 
 
<profile income="65935.40"><interest category="category40" /> 
<interest category="category30" /> 
<gender>male</gender> 
<business>No</business> 
<age>33</age> 
</profile> 
 
<profile income="62004.90"><interest category="category37" /> 
<gender>male</gender> 
<business>Yes</business> 
<age>33</age> 
</profile> 
 
<profile income="9876.00"><interest category="category30" /> 
<education>Graduate School</education> 
<business>Yes</business> 
<age>33</age> 
</profile> 
 
<profile income="31709.85"><interest category="category50" /> 
<interest category="category46" /> 
<interest category="category31" /> 
<education>Other</education> 
<business>No</business> 
<age>33</age> 
</profile> 
 
<profile income="13560.28"><interest category="category29" /> 
<interest category="category3" /> 
<interest category="category40" /> 
<interest category="category29" /> 
<interest category="category27" /> 
<interest category="category18" /> 
<interest category="category10" /> 
<education>Other</education> 
<business>Yes</business> 
<age>33</age> 
</profile> 
 
<profile income="52458.60"><interest category="category40" /> 
<interest category="category20" /> 
<interest category="category16" /> 
<interest category="category44" /> 
<interest category="category48" /> 
<business>No</business> 
<age>33</age> 
</profile> 
